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Abstract
This paper starts with the premise that one of the possible solutions
to state fragility is development from within, which is achieved
partly through civil society and states’ self-help. It begins with the
definitions used in this paper, and then tries to establish very briefly
the relationship between civil society and state fragility. Then, it
tries to determine what civil society could do to reconstruct fragile
states in general. Finally, it applies parts of the latter to Angola,
examining the successes and failures of its civil society, while
focusing only on the role of NGOs. Through this methodology, it
tries to answer the question “To what extent is Civil Society
successful in reconstructing/rebuilding Angola as a Fragile State?”.
This topic is significant because state fragility is on the rise, and is
hard to control. The paper argues that although Angolan civil
society is rather limited and weakened by the state and international
organizations, there are opportunities for increasing its
effectiveness. It might not be significantly successful today, but with
all limitations considered, it is bringing about small positive changes
that will impact the future of Democracy in Angola in the long run.

Relationship between Civil Society and State
Fragility
‘Failed States’ is a term that gained resonance in the
early 1990s (Nay, 2012, p. 1). Since then, it triggered
*
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academic debate over what it really means, who defines
the degree of failure and whose agenda does the term
serve. The hegemonic school is the North American
school and it uses the term to specifically describe severe
political crises the happened in the 1990s (Besada &
Hannan, 2007, p. 2). Jean-Germain Gros (1996)
categorized failed states into five types. There are
‘anarchic states’ that lack centralized government and
‘phantom states’ which have a semblance of authority
but no real one. There are also ‘anemic states’ which are
states that lack the state spirit, ‘captured states’ which
are states dominated by insecure rivaling elites and
finally, there is the ‘in vitro’ or aborted states which
failed before the emergence of a state machine (Besada
& Hannan, 2007, p. 2-3). In contrast to the North
American school, the European and Institutional
literature frown upon the term ‘Failed State’ (Besada &
Hannan,2007, p. 3). It is claimed that it’s a term that
refers to the periphery, providing a theoretical
underpinning and a diplomatic justification behind the
intervention of the Global North in the domestic affairs
of the ‘underdeveloped South’ pushing for neoliberal
policies.
According to William Zartman (1995) and Robert
Rotberg (2003), whose school of thought is advocated in
this paper, state fragility is simply an assessment of how
a state is performing its tasks and responsibilities. The
tasks vary from securing essential freedoms, building
infrastructure, protecting territories and borders,
maintaining internal security to sustaining economic
growth and providing public goods such as sanitation
2
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and education (Rotberg, 2003, p. 7). According to
Rotberg, a state is fragile if it does not meet a ‘certain’
threshold (Rotberg, 2003, p. 1). Failure and collapse
happen when the “structure, authority, law and political
order” cease to be effective (Pegg, 1996, p. 238). A state
does not have to meet its tasks to completion but if it
fails to meet highly weighted and important fronts, then
it is categorized as a fragile state (Rotberg, 2003, p. 4).
In this paper, the Fragile State Index is used as a
quantitative measure of fragility. Formerly known as the
Failed State Index, the Fragile State Index is an annual
index and report introduced by The Fund for Peace and
was used by Foreign Policy magazine a little over a
decade ago.
The literature asserts that fragile states do not develop
overnight and hence reconstruction of fragile states takes
time, partly because of the complexity of the problems
causing the fragility (Pegg, 1996, p. 238). The
international community needs to intervene and help in
reconstructing those states because fragility overspills
and the crisis they breed are transnational problems. We
do not live in a vacuum and hence, countries should
cooperate to reconstruct fragile states.
During the 1990s, and after the end of the Cold War, the
world order shifted. The emergence of a new world order
in addition to the already existing domestic problems
induced by the war brought about drastic changes to
which some states failed to cope with. These problems
ranged from civil wars, to the inability to secure citizens,
to economic recession and territorial losses (Nay, 2012,
p. 1). Countries were expected to resolve conflict
3
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through the UN (Tabbush, 2005, p. 10). However, the
world witnessed series of the worst atrocities since the
Holocaust in which UNSC stood helpless, failing those
who were in dire need for help, as, for example, the
Srebrenica massacre during the Bosnian genocide
(1995). Before and parallel to the conflict in Kosovo,
were the Somalia crisis (1992) and the Rwandan
genocide (1994), amongst other traumatizing conflicts.
With the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina, most of the
crises took place in Africa.
After the African wave of independence during the
1960s, there was a trend of constant military coups,
instability, lack of state legitimacy, malnutrition and
starvation, poverty, inequality, ethnic violence, brutal
international intervention and breached mandates.
Parallel to these deeply rooted problems was the HIV
epidemic which was on the rise since the 1980s,
worsening the situation further. All this qualified African
countries to top the State Fragility Index, while the need
for reconstruction became more grave and apparent.
The mechanism through which reconstruction was
attempted during the 1990s was arguably limited
because there is only so much the UN could do. UN
members often cooperate through fiscal aid and
supplying peacekeeping missions with a workforce.
However, sometimes aid or foreign intervention are not
enough in eradicating the roots of fragility especially in
the case of a cultural crisis such as ethnic conflict or
gender-based violence. This is where civil society or

4
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reconstruction from within the fragile state factors in the
equation.
The term ‘civil society’ dates back to the Greek era
where it was defined as the realm parallel to but separate
from the state (Carothers, 1999-2000, p. 18). It did not
gain an edge until the post-World War Two era when
Antonio Gramsci defined it as an entity that was
politically independent from the state, directing all its
efforts against totalitarian regimes (Carothers, 19992000, p. 19). Academically, the use of the term peaked in
the post-Cold War period.
According to Maha Abdelrahman (2004), civil society is
defined as the space that exists outside the market, the
state and the family (Abdelrahman, 2004, p. 41). It is
the ‘reservoir of formal and informal organizations’ such
trade, labor unions and syndicates, state-independent
Mosques and Churches, book clubs, blog spheres and
alternative media as well as NGOs and associations.
(Posner, 2004. p. 237; Carothers, 1999-2000, p. 19-20).
In ‘NGOs in the Contemporary World Order’,
Abdelrahman discussed the evolution of the definition
across the decades starting with the premise that the
definition is a negative residual category. It is basically
what is automatically left out of the major three spheres
of power: state, family and the market.
Although theoretically, civil society is commonly
defined as a nonpolitical entity, it is not, because it needs
the political sphere to manifest its work and channel its
5
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efforts (Tabbush, 2005, p. 10). In simpler terms, civil
society needs the state machine. Mike Davis argues that
civil society even helps the state. It diverts attention from
structural adjustment adopted by the government (Davis,
2007, p. 77). He also argued that civil society, and
specifically NGOs, became a façade to perpetuate
inequality, lack of wealth distribution and failure of the
government to solve problems created by soft
imperialism and the neoliberal model (Davis, 2007, p.
82; Ghaus-Pasha, 2005, p. 10).
Parallel to and partly as a result of neoliberal leaps in the
1980s and 1990s, the emphasis on civil society was more
directed to NGOs and the role they ‘had’ to play in
development and political change. This is when NGOs
witnessed a surge in their duties and an evolution of their
relationship with the state becoming more ‘embedded’.
Their influence grew and they actively contributed in the
development of different countries (Ghaus-Pasha, 2005,
p. 4). According to Abdelrahman, civil society and
specifically NGOs were promoted partly by the
neoliberal model as less corrupt entities compared to the
state and the market. They were perceived to be more
efficient, less bureaucratic and more responsive and
receptive to society’s demands and people’s needs than
the state ever was (Abdelrahman, 2004, p. 51-58). They
were also advertised to be ‘small’ structures which
facilitates communication and delegation from within the
structure as opposed to the nepotistic, inefficient
bureaucracy governments rely on. They are deemed to be
the ‘best’ way to overcome the shortcomings and
limitations of the state (Posner, 2004. P. 237). According
6
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to Daniel Posner, civil society is perceived to have
‘magical’ solutions to deeply rooted problems that states
do not have the capabilities to solve (Posner, 2004. P.
237). This all contributed to the development of a
romanticized version of civil society. It also led to the
increasing significance of its work parallel to state
shrinkage around the globe.
Fragile states have their share of the ‘deeply rooted
problems’ Posner discussed. Civil society is
automatically expected to seize the reins, figuratively
and literally, solving these crises because not only is the
state limited by its structure, but it’s ‘fragile’ and
incapable of performing its tasks. There are two main
mechanisms through which civil society works in
general: substitution and advocacy (Posner, 2004. P.
239). Substitution is where civil society completely
substitutes the state whereas advocacy is where it
advocates its role, spearheading national projects while
the state still maintains power over civil society. In the
case of fragile states, it is not sufficient that civil society
advocates the role of the state (Dowst, 2009, p. 6). It is
expected to be strong, organized and capable of
substituting the state complementing and customizing its
effort to the level of fragility. This establishes a positive
relationship between the two variables: state fragility and
civil society.
Having civil society substitute the state machine shows
how the former can significantly affect fragile states
because it becomes civil society’s mission to perform the
states’ tasks: protect its population and provide public
7
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goods such as education, sanitation, public health and
infrastructure. The shift of roles is arguably not easy and
it is hard to pinpoint when it exactly happens. During
times of crises, states’ shrinkage and fragility becomes
more apparent and civil society, normatively, fills in the
vacuum. However, this is not always the case.
Sometimes, fragile states deliberately weaken civil
society through repression and alienation which results
in a hectic, and often brutal and incomplete transition,
leaving the state in a limbo like Somalia today. Also it
depends on the level of fragility. This all affects the
significance and span of power civil society has and it
dictates its role to a high extent especially when civil
society is not a solitary, homogenous unit.
How can Civil Society reconstruct fragile states?
One could argue that civil society organizations (CSO)
do not use the same approach tackling different causes of
fragility.. For instance, what a CSO could do in a fragile
state where corruption and unemployment are the main
concerns, is drastically different from what it could bring
about when the state is plagued with ethnic conflict
which require a certain maneuver in tackling because its
scars run deeper. Hence, this section will briefly discuss
possible opportunities for involvement of civil society
within fragile states in general.
Also this paper adopts the post-conflict perspective
which focuses on what could civil society do to
reconstruct the ‘already’ fragile state. (Dowst, 2009, p.
8) (Santos, 2002, p. 43). It is where civil society is
8
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involved in the peace and nation-building processes
which follow the problems that partly contributed to the
fragility. It is argued that civil society cannot work in a
fragile state that lacks security and basic infrastructure
(Posner, 2004, p. 46); even though this is debatable, this
paper adopts this understanding. Angola was selected
because it survived ethnic conflict and it is highly
fragile. However it has not reached the fragility level
where there is a lack of security or total destruction of
infrastructure which gives civil society the ‘space’ to
achieve reconstruction, as one could see in the appendix
below.
One of the key steps that civil society needs to take is
developing flexibility and operability with other
state/nation-building institutions (Uvin & Cohen, 2006,
p. 3). It is important for CSOs not to work in isolation or
separate themselves from other institutions, because the
complexity of the issues that contribute to fragility needs
simultaneous tackling through several fronts. In fragile
states, society is broken apart. Community-based
projects are often what keeps it going (World Bank,
2005, P. 1). Working against them can be adding to the
damage and cementing it. Civil society needs to
cooperate and compliment other efforts to guarantee a
level of consistency and possibly a faster, and a more
efficient process of reconstruction because in the context
of fragile states, time is usually not on civil society’s
side. Fragility is likely to be uncontrollable and the race
downwards can be unstoppable and hence there is a need
for an organized and a realistic plan that civil society can
achieve in partnership with other institutions (Posner,
9
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2004, p. 46). They do not need to have uniformity of
mission statements and goals but they need to have the
same vision and they need to cooperate (World Banks,
2005, p. 8). In fragile states, conflict between groups is
likely to be high. If conflict spreads between civil society
organizations, reconstruction becomes even harder to
achieve.
As a result, civil society organizations need to be
involved in the national dialogue tackling more than one
front of the crises causing the fragility (Uvin & Cohen,
2006, p. 3). They need to communicate effectively
through a ‘national dialogue’ that has a realistic end date
and a clear agenda. National dialogues have tendencies
to drag on and thus the need for clear planning. CSOs
need a bottom-up approach where they work at the
grassroots levels especially in countries suffering from
sectarian and ethnic divides. They need to learn how to
initiate transitional justice through culture change
programmes and to be able to mediate the group
grievances because they hurdle the reconstruction
process.
Another thing civil society needs to do is to assist the
efforts of the government empowering it rather than
limiting its power (Uvin & Cohen, 2006, p. 3). Civil
society needs to reassume its role as the ‘watchdog’
rather than the state substitute and it needs to shift again
the executive power to the state. Once it regains its
advocacy, it needs to monitor the state especially in
regards to corruption and Human Rights violations for
the grave risks associated with them. It needs to also
10
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mobilize the social spheres to pressure the government to
be more transparent and responsive to the masses’ needs
(Uvin & Cohen, 2006, p. 3). This can be hard to achieve
amidst fragility but it is essential because both corruption
and Human Rights violations have deep roots and are
hard to eradicate. There has to be consistent supervision
and monitoring which civil society is by default
equipped to perform.
Civil society could also mediate between the society and
foreign intervention (World Bank, 2005, P. 6). Fragile
states’ are often fertile ground for intervention. A strong
civil society is likely to mitigate the extent of
intervention and control it to some extent. It needs to be
aware of what is expected out of this intervention and
follow it through. Their contribution is significant
because it is the voice of the local and assuming that the
intervention has ‘noble’ intentions, its mandate and
capabilities are likely to be limited if civil society is not
capable of voicing its demands clearly, reflecting what
the locals need.
Civil Society and State Fragility in Angola.
The post-conflict perspective starts in 2002 after the end
of a brutal civil war that lasted on Angolan ground for
almost 27 years (Vines & Weimer, 2011, p. 4). During
the 1960s, battles against the Portuguese colonizer in
Angola erupted (Vines & Weimer, 2011, p. 4). However
the conflict quickly spiraled into a civil war between the
liberation movements fighting to fill the power vacuum.
The Portuguese colonizer did not prepare their colonies
11
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for independence which left Angola unprepared for and
exposed to the problems associated with transitional
periods such as inflation, economic depression,
unemployment and violence. What worsened the
situation further was the ‘primordial’ ethnic tension
between several groups (Rocha, 2002, p. 3). In 1975,
Angola gained formal independence but was further
submersed in ruthless fighting (Kibble & Vines, 2001, p.
538). It was mainly between The Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) who supported the
government and the liberation movements: The National
Front for Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and, most
importantly, The National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) (Vines & Weimer,
2011, p. 4; Rocha, 2002, p. 3).
The war was prolonged by foreign intervention, as the
USSR supported UNITA and the ‘West’ supported the
FNLA and the rebels. In 1977, there was a failed attempt
to overthrow Angola’s first president who was a member
in MPLA (Vines & Weimer, 2011, p. 5). The failed coup
increased the instability, heightened the group
grievances and severed the ties between the different
groups (Vines & Weimer, 2011, p. 5). Demographically,
the peasants and the poor were severely marginalized by
the urban led MPLA (Vines & Weimer, 2011, p. 5).
UNITA resorted to guerilla tactics to undermine
MPLA’s power, worsening the divide between the urban
and rural further as they aided the rural against MPLA’s
urban masses which had devastating results.

12
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The element of ethnicity is a significant contributor to
Angola’s fragility. Moreover, the civil war brought about
other plagues to the already weakened society,
maintaining the high fragility values. By 2007, there was
over a million out of 17.7 million Angolans relying on
the UN Food programme to stay alive, while 3.7 million
were put on war-victims programmes (Kibble, & Vines,
2001, p.538). In addition, about 70,000 Angolans lost
their limbs (Kibble, S., & Vines, A., 2001, P.538). Two
to four million Angolans were internally displaced and
hundreds of thousands fled their homes and sought
refuge in other African states (Kibble & Vines, 2001,
p.538).
Also, Angola was reported to be one of the worst
countries in terms of health and sanitation. The mortality
rate, in 2007, for children under five was 30 per cent
(Kibble & Vines, 2001, p.538). Only one in every five
could attain sanitation. Only one in three had access to
clean water (Rocha, 2002, pp. 1-2). In 1999, the
government spent only 1.5% of Angola’s GDP on health
programmes, which is appalling, and yet consistent with
the mortality rates, and what was reported regarding
health in 2007 (Kibble & Vines, 2001, p. 538). The
annual inflation rate was set at 3,000 per cent which
caused tension and added to people’s misery and poverty
because of the rising prices and the minimal wages
(Kibble & Vines, 2001, p. 538). It was no coincidence
to find that half of the Angolan children were not in
schools, which is significant because 45% of the
Angolan Population were below the age 14 back then
(Kibble & Vines, 2001, p. 538). It it also interesting to
13
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look at government budgets and how they were
distributed: Before 2007, the Angolan government
allocated 7% to education as opposed to 33% for
security (Kibble & Vines, 2001, p. 538). Those are all
manifestations of fragility which was represented in a
fragility score of 84.9/100 in 2007 (see Appendix
below).
It is important to establish that none of those problems
are alien to African countries. Most African countries
share the same problems, to different degrees. Angola’s
not an outlier, since it has maintained roughly the same
levels of fragility since 2006. Figure number one, and
the table in the Appendix below show the extent of
variance of scores and how fragile Angola is.

90.0

Angolan State Fragility Scores

88.0
86.0
84.0
82.0
80.0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year
Figure 1: State Fragility Scores for Angola (x/100)
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It might be argued that it is challenging to trace the
outcomes of civil society efforts directly. However, these
could be analyzed over a long term period. One could
see, for instance, that in 2008 the degree of fragility
decreased rather significantly which can be surprising
after the statistics provided above for 2007. I thought it
could be useful to trace civil society efforts before 2008
and 2010 (when another drop in fragility values
happened) to understand what possibly could have
induced the change.
One could argue that before 1990s, the Angolan state
controlled all affairs in an iron grip. With the fall of the
USSR, MPLA was no longer internationally backed up
by a superpower and it was ‘forced’ to liberalize legally
in 1991 which was an opportunity for civil society to
grow (Chatham House, 2005, p. 9). The Angolan civil
society witnessed the emergence of the FONGA (Forum
of Angolan NGOs) as the umbrella for all ‘authentic’
Angolan voices (Chatham House, 2005, p. 9). It
showcases one of the successes of Angolan civil society
because it was able to guarantee some level of
operability with other NGOs which was discussed above
in the second section of this paper. It remained limited
and subordinated though as an automatic result of the
dominance of the international NGOs and their
involvement. Compared to other African countries, the
emergence of the Angolan civil society was slow yet
steady. There were no sudden changes which is actually
consistent with the trend describing Angolan fragility
values which remained in the same range since the
creation of the fragility index in 2006.
15
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National NGOs in Angola focus mainly on human and
political rights and social development. They allocate
their focus to attain transparency and pressure the
government to open up and declare their
acknowledgement of basic human rights. They were
successful to some extent, as they embedded a new set of
values (Chatham House, 2005, p. 14). Today, there is
consensus regarding the need for ‘democratization’.
Angola had not held elections since 1992 (Chatham
House, 2005, p. 14). Despite this, the masses are aware
of how corrupt their government is. NGOs were
successful in promoting the weaknesses of the
government and how it can be malleable to liberalization
in the beginning and then democratization later. One of
the main reasons why there is hope for civil society to
grow stronger and further contribute to the
reconstruction of Angola, is the weak state. Angola has a
very weak government that is decentralized and more
interested in ‘formal’ power gains (Chatham House,
2005, p. 14). Angolan civil society has the capabilities
and the opportunity to bring about full-fledged change
because of the extent of state weakness. This all marks
another sign of success because they have the awareness.
There are approximately about 100 International NGOs
working in Angola and 300 national ones (Amundsen &
Abreu, 2006, p. 10). This is a relatively high number
keeping in mind that Angola does not have very high
population density. It is significant to see a relatively
high number of NGOs coming together and working
cooperatively on political rights and awareness. They
raise awareness about the need for transparency, justice,
16
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constitutional reform, institutional meritocracy and
freedom of expression and assembly (Amundsen &
Abreu, 2006, p. 10). In 2000, Angola witnessed the
emergence of two major organizations advocating
justice. The first was Mãos Livres, supported by the UN
Human Rights Division (Chatham House, 2005, p. 14).
The other was AJPD which was founded by Angolan
youth groups who had a catholic background and
supported the penal system, constitutional reform and
HIV legislations (Chatham House, 2005, p. 14). They
used the media and street mobilization to put forward
their beliefs. This reflects the success of domestic NGOs
who accomplished operability with international
organizations.
Another sign of relative success of NGOs’ work in
Angola is inducing harmony between different groups
(Santos, 2002, p. 47). When looking at fragility index
values (Appendix), one could see that the group
grievances are relatively low. Sources assert that since
2002 onwards, the civil strife diminished and NGOs
were able to encourage tolerance and acceptance of the
Other to some extent (Santos, 2002, p. 47). There are
other important factors contributing to the decreased
ethnic tension such as its origins for instance, but NGOs
are major actors that were able to stop such conflict from
spiraling out of control again which is easy to achieve
especially with Angola having its share of civil war for
decades.
There might not be empirical results yet of NGOs work
on the ground, as the government still has not held
17
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elections. However, there is rising awareness in Angola
which could be seen as weak progress but progress it is
nonetheless because, besides raising awareness, CSOs
managed to induce harmony between different groups
and push for liberalization. Tangible achievements in
social development include a better heath programme
(Affolter & Cabula, 2010, p. 277) that includes care for
HIV and Malaria. There are also concrete results in
education. Domestic NGOs have allocated their efforts
to work parallel to UNDP in a campaign for Civic
Education in order to bring Angolans together and to
also spread awareness about their political rights
(Affolter, & Cabula, 2010, p. 279). One could argue that
Angola is still in the process of state-building which
leaves a lot of opportunity for civil society to operate.
However, domestic NGOs’ capabilities are limited to
some extent. When reading about the logistics of civics
campaign, one would realize that UNDP is in control
(Affolter & Cabula, 2010, p. 276). It is understandable
that UNDP may have more experience with education on
grounds than local NGOs, however it is arguably
infringing on domestic NGOs’ autonomy.
Also, the Angolan state does not acknowledge NGOs or
civil society efforts in general (Santos, 2002, p. 48).
Despite its weakness and fragility as a state that cannot
protect its own nation, the Angolan regime still controls
the legislative branch and they are legally restricting
civil society. They are not drafting laws to stop NGOs
deliberately but they are employing the rigid, nepotistic
bureaucracy to impede their progress and stop their work
(Santos, 2002, p. 48).
18
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Conclusion
Angolan NGOs were successful on some fronts, one of
which is the ethnic conflict. They were able to introduce
peace, maintain it through civic education and raise
awareness about the importance of essential freedoms,
basic human rights and political rights, which was a
relatively successful formula in fighting remnants of
civil war. They were successful in working with each
other, through merging the areas they tackle and they
were also able to work with international organizations.
One could see, though, that Angolan NGOs do not work
parallel to UN bodies but under them. It could be argued
that Angolan NGOs are not autonomous. They are
heavily subordinated to some international organizations
and subject to control by the Angolan state which limits
NGOs’ power and the extent of their influence.
However, that does not mean that civil society is not
effective in Angola. So far, it might not be significantly
successful in reconstructing Angola as a fragile state.
However it is inducing progress in terms of the civic
duty. They are building what one might call ‘the right
things in the heart’ which is the essence of democracy.
They are not only educating the masses about their rights
and responsibilities but also pressuring the government
to hold elections. They are not only tackling economic
growth but also democracy. They might not be
democratizing yet, but they are slowly pushing for
liberalization. In parallel to that they are building the
bases for a full democracy. There is hope for civil
society in Angola and there is hope that it achieves the
19
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latter’s reconstruction, it is arguably just a matter of
time.
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Appendix: Angola’s State Fragility Values, 2006-2015

Data compiled from: http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015
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